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  At present, the enhanced HIPC initiative and the Gleneagles Proposal for 
debt write-downs by the G8 are the main mechanisms used to reduce 
indebtedness of low-income countries. In these countries where poor 
governance is a key issue, it is naïve to believe that the Millennium 
Development Goals can be achieved if the current debt relief mechanisms fail 
to address such problem. In this paper, we develop a model of sovereign debt 
write-downs, where governance problems reflect domestic distributive conflict 
between two classes in the society and intertemporal conflict. The main policy 
issue is how to design the optimal form of debt write-downs and the 
conditionality requirements attached to it with such governance problems in 
mind. To deal with the domestic distributive conflict, it is crucial that the 
conditionality requirements target both provision of public goods and private 
consumption level of the poor citizens. Addressing the intertemporal conflict 
problem requires the use of long-run conditionality requirements. Against such 
a benchmark, we then evaluate the efficacy of the current debt relief initiatives 
and discuss some policy implications. 
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Despite signi￿cant bene￿ts derived from stronger global economic growth
and improvement in world-wide living conditions over the past two decades,
much of the developing world still remains mired in poverty. As a re-
sponse, the United Nations have endorsed a set of Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), including health and education, as an international
blueprint for promoting development (United Nations, 2006). However,
it is di¢ cult for these goals to be attained if debt obligations are exces-
sive as is, by de￿nition, true for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(hereafter, HIPCs).
In Sachs (2002), Je⁄rey Sachs argues that there is a rationale for
granting a ￿fresh start￿to poor countries when they are vulnerable to a
poverty trap. He evaluates the e¢ caciousness of the current mechanisms
used to reduce the indebtedness of the HIPCs, which include the HIPC
initiative of 1999 and the Gleneagles Proposal for debt write-down by
the G8 countries. Under these initiatives, low-income countries that fell
into a debt crisis have not received su¢ cient debt reduction to restore
growth and reestablish normal relationship with the creditors. It has
been manifest that arbitrary formulas ￿the criteria such as the ratio of
debt to export or ratio of debt to government revenue ￿have been used
in the debt sustainability analysis under the HIPC initiative of 19999 to
decide on the level of debt relief. With such criteria, a country cannot
truly be judged as sustainable or unsustainable except in the context of
its needs, which must be carefully spelled out. To address such problems,
Je⁄rey Sachs provides a framework for the theory that should underpin
debt relief. In particular, he proposes that debt relief should be based
on a systematic assessment of each country￿ s needs, measured against
the explicit development objectives like the MDGs.
Despite the appealing suggestions put forward by Je⁄rey Sachs, his
analysis still fails to take into account the ￿politics￿of sovereign debt
relief. This issue is extremely important as for these low-income coun-
tries, particularly in Africa, there are corruption, con￿ ict between the
ruling elites and the poors they govern and excessive issue of sovereign
debt by the elite class. When poor governance is a key issue, it is crucial
to ensure that the conditions attached to the debt relief help address
such problems. However, by examining the current debt relief initiatives
￿the enhanced HIPC initiative of 1999 and the Gleneagle Proposal ￿we
￿nd that this is not the case as the former includes a good deal of inap-
propriate requirements and the conditions imposed by the latter are the
same as those required to reach the completion point under the former1;
1￿Countries must be current on their repayment obligations to the IFIs and must
2therefore, it is na￿ve to believe that the MDGs can be achieved and the
well-being of the poor is improved.
With the problem of poor governance in mind, in this paper, we study
the optimal form of debt write-down and the design of conditionality
requirements attached to it to ensure that the well-being of poor citizens
in those low-income countries improves and the MDGs are achieved.
We consider a fully liberalised economy, consisting of elites and poor
citizens. When the elites have all the bargaining power, they determine
relevant policy choices subject to the participation constraint of the poor
citizens. The domestic distributive con￿ict exists when the elites curtail
public expenditure on state education and public health as well as private
consumption of the poor citizens and use the public funds (including the
resources freed up by debt relief) to support their private consumption.
The elites also make a policy choice on public debts that determines the
probability of default: a policy which supports an excessive issuing of
public debts raises the default policy. Due to their shortsightedness or
myopia, the elites do have an incentive to put in place policies on public
debts (which are not optimal from the perspective of poor citizens) that
signi￿cantly increase the probability of default. This gives rise to the
problem of intertemporal con￿ict. Since the elites are e⁄ectively insured
against the possibility of default, only the poor citizens su⁄er as they
are forced to bear a disproportionately high share of default costs.
In the economy where the problems of domestic distributive con￿ict
and intertemporal con￿ict are prevalent, we show how the conditional-
ity requirements attached to the debt write-down could have a crucial
impact on the well-being of the poor citizens. We consider two versions
of the model, static and dynamic.
In the static model, we use the generalised Nash bargaining frame-
work to study how the distribution of power between the elites and the
poor citizens plays a crucial role as it determines the relative utility gains
of both classes from debt write-down in the equilibrium. Our results
show that for the society with a balanced distribution of power between
the two classes, unconditional debt write-down is su¢ cient to ensure
that the well-being of the poor citizens is improved. On the other hand,
for the society where all power is in the hands of the elites and where the
problem of domestic distributive con￿ict is present, it is necessary that
the conditionality requirements attached to the debt write-down target
not have experienced serious lapses, including in governance, such that their IMF
programs would be at risk. Finally, the proposal makes several references to trans-
parency and country performance as criteria for the allocation of development assis-
tance,￿(IMF, 2005).
3both provision of public goods2 and the private consumption level of the
poor citizens.
It is important to note that, unlike Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2001, 2006), our main emphasis in this paper is not to model power and
changes in the institutions. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001),
they analyse how de facto political power drives changes in political
institutions and the future distribution of de jure political power, while
in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), they study how equilibrium economic
institutions emerge from the interaction between political institutions,
which allocate de jure political power, and the distribution of de facto
political power. Instead, we study how the outcome of a bargaining
situation may be in￿ uenced by the exogenously determined bargaining
power of the two classes.
We then extend the model to a dynamic framework, which is based
on a two-period repeated game approach. In the dynamic setup, the na-
tional resource in the second period is stochastic, depending on whether
or not the elites choose to default. Our results show that, if the condi-
tions on public goods and private consumption of the poors are imposed
in the ￿rst period, the elites can get around such conditions by issuing
more public debts. While issuing excessive public debts is favouring the
elites since they can use the additional resources raised from the issue of
new public debts to ￿nance their private consumption and once default
occurs they are e⁄ectively insured against the default costs, it is not
bene￿cial for the poor citizens. The main reason behind this is that the
poor citizens have to su⁄er from a high share of default costs, particu-
larly from a permanent contraction in national income and everlasting
exclusion from the international capital market.
This opposing views of the elites and the poor citizens with regards
to issue of public debts lead to an existence of intertemporal con￿ict be-
tween the two classes. To keep this problem in check, our results suggest
that the long-run conditionality requirements, which are structured in
such a way that elites bear the consequences of excessive debts and de-
fault. For example, the external funding agency could require the elites
to protect public goods and social spending and, at the same time,
imposing an explicit limit on the amount of public debts the elites are
allowed to issue.
2The public goods, such as education and health, are important components of
the MDGs. They are not only valuable in themselves but they also increase the
income-generating capacity of the low-income countries in question (Stern, Dethier
and Rogers, 2005). In particular, for the society where the problem of domestic dis-
tributive con￿ict is prevalent, it is very crucial to link debt relief to public investment
in public goods as there is a very high tendency that they will be underprovided by
the ruling elites.
4Against such a benchmark, we then evaluate the e¢ cacy of the cur-
rent initiatives for debt write-down under the enhanced HIPC initiative
and the Gleneagles Proposal for debt write-down by the G8 countries.
We discuss about the e⁄ectiveness of the conditionality requirements
under these two debt relief initiatives as well as the conditionality pre-
scribed by the IMF under its ￿nancial support programme, particularly
maintenance of primary budget surplus. We then conclude by making
some policy recommendations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we
develop a static model of debt write-downs, which captures the problem
of domestic distributive con￿ict between the two classes in the society.
Section 3 is devoted to discuss the design of conditionality requirements
attached to the debt write-downs under a static framework. In section
4, we extend the model to a dynamic framework to study the problem of
intertemporal con￿ict. In section 5, we evaluate the e¢ cacy of the recent
initiatives for debt write-down and discuss some policy recommendations
while section 6 concludes. Some of the technical materials are contained
in the appendix.
2 The static model
Consider an economy consisting of two classes, namely elites (indexed
by E) and poor citizens (indexed by P), who live for one period. In the
static model, we assume that the national income, y, is non-stochastic
and exogenously determined. In this fully liberalised economy, a new
public debt can be issued at a constant rate of interest, r > 0. We
assume that the external funding agency imposes a limit on the amount
of public debts the country is allowed to issue, given by ~ D. The debt
obligation falling due is (1+r)D￿1, where D￿1 is the exogenously given
stock of public debt. The national resource, I, characterises a surplus
of ￿xed size and is given by I = y + ~ D ￿ (1 + r)D￿1, where I > 0. All
variables are measured in ￿real￿terms; therefore, there is no issue of
in￿ ation nor foreign exchange rate risk.
The two classes, elites and poor citizens, bargain over the parti-
tion of a national resource of size I. The budget constraint is given
by xE + xP + cG ￿ I, where G is the provision of public goods, xE
is the private consumption level of the elites, xP is the private con-
sumption level of the poor citizens and c > 0 is a constant unit cost of









We impose the non-negativity constraints on G, xE and xP thus
G ￿ 0, xE ￿ 0 and xP ￿ 0. For each class i, Ui (G;xi) is the utility
5obtained by class i from G and xi, where i = E;P. For all i, Ui (G;xi)
is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both (G;xi) and is twice
continuously di⁄erentiable. To ensure that the private consumption level
of the poor citizens is always strictly positive (i.e. xP > 0), the following




Before proceeding, we ￿nd it very important to address the following
points explicitly. First, in this static framework, since the newly issued
public debt is included in the national resource, I, which is to be splitted
between the elites and the poor citizens in bargaining, granting a debt
relief to such country will lead to an expansion in the national resource.
Second, we assume that the limit on the amount of new public debt
the country is allowed to issue, ~ D, is exogenously determined by the
external funding agency at the beginning of the period. Third, even
though there are several approaches in which we can use to study the
problem of domestic distributive con￿ict between the two classes in the
society, in this section, we use the generalised Nash bargaining approach
because this framework is easy to work with; it possesses sound strategic
foundations and it allows us to study how the outcome of a bargaining
situation may be in￿ uenced by the distribution of power between the
two classes and the granting of debt relief.
If the two classes fail to reach agreement in bargaining, then class i
obtains a ￿disagreement income￿di which we assume to be a fraction
of the national resource, i.e. di = ~ diI, where ~ di 2 (0;1). We assume
that the fractions, ~ dE and ~ dP, are exogenously determined and ~ dE > ~ dP.
When no agreement can be reached, the level of public good provision
is zero and class i spends all the disagreement income on his private







. Throughout this paper, we refer to the










interchangeably. Since we assume that ~ dE > ~ dP, it follows that dE
u > dP
u
thus the elites￿disagreement utility is higher than the poor citizens￿
and our justi￿cation is as follows. The elites usually have access to the
￿outside option￿ , which allows them to opt out when no agreement can





2 ￿ such that UE ￿
G;xE￿
> dE










, is known as the ￿disagreement
point￿ . In order to de￿ne the generalised Nash bargaining solution
of this bargaining situation, it is useful to ￿rst de￿ne the set ￿ = ￿
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G;xE￿















, is derived as follows. The
lower bound, U








subject to xE +xP +cG ￿ I, G ￿ 0, xE ￿ 0 and xP > 0. When xP = I,
it follows from the budget constraint that the corner solutions, G = 0
and xE = 0, result. It follows that U
E = UE (0;0). The upper bound,








subject to xE + xP + cG ￿ I, G ￿ 0, xE ￿ 0 and xP > 0. When
xP = 0, the elites make the policy choices for
￿
G;xE￿
in such a way
that UE ￿
G;xE￿






























u. The constraints xE + xP + cG ￿ I, xE ￿ 0, xP > 0 and G ￿ 0 can




u, can represented by the set ￿2. Thus, for




, the poor citizens￿indirect utility is given by:







s.t. ￿1 and ￿2
￿
: (4)
It follows from (4) that h(I;uE) represents the utility the poor citi-





diately follows that the set of utility possibility frontier is given by
￿ =
￿





and uP = h(I;uE)
￿
; (5)




￿! <. Even though,
as long as the utility functions for the elites and the poor citizens are
well-behaved, the properties of the poor citizens￿indirect utility function
h(I;uE) are standard, for future reference, we summarise such properties
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Figure 1: The utility possibility frontier in the static model
Lemma 1 For a ￿xed I, the function h(I;uE) is strictly decreasing in
uE and concave. An increase in I leads to an a¢ ne transformation of
the graph of function h(I;uE).
Proof. See appendix.
The utility possibility frontier, h(I;uE), is depicted in Figure 1.
The utility possibility frontier shown in Figure 1 is strictly decreas-
ing in uE and concave. Moreover, an increase in I results in an a¢ ne
transformation or an outward parallel shift in the frontier as discussed
in Lemma 1.
In what follows, we de￿ne the generalised Nash bargaining solution
of the bargaining situation described above. For each ￿ 2 [0;1], the
generalised (or, asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution3 is a function
3Let us de￿ne the bargaining problem in a similar way as in Muthoo(1999, p.22).
A bargaining problem is a pair (￿;du), where ￿ ￿ <2 and du ￿ <2, where ￿ is






is the disagreement point (or the utility pair obtainable if the players fail to reach
agreement. If (uE;uP) 2 ￿, it follows that there exists an agreement which gives
class i, where i = E;P, a utility ui 2 <. The bargaining problem should satisfy the
following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 The Pareto frontier ￿eff of the set ￿ is the graph of a concave









such that uE > dE
u and uP > dP
u.
Assumption 2 The set ￿w of weakly Pareto e¢ cient utility pairs is closed. A
utility pair (uE;uP) 2 ￿w if and only if (uE;uP) 2 ￿ and there does not exist
another utility pair (u0
E;u0
P) 2 ￿ such that u0
E > uE and u0
P > uP. Note that
￿w ￿ ￿eff.
8uGN
￿ : ￿ ￿! <2, de￿ned as follows. For each (￿;du) 2 ￿, uGN
￿ (￿;du) is















(uE;uP) 2 ￿eff : uE ￿ dE
u and uP ￿ dP
u
￿
and ￿ ￿{(￿;du) :
￿ ￿ <2, du 2 <2 and the pair (￿;du) satis￿es Assumption 1 and 2}.
The maximand of the generalised Nash bargaining problem (some-


















for an arbitrary constant k > 0. The function uP stated in equation
(7) is quasiconcave and continuous. It is shown in Figure 1 as the curve
labelled uP.
The maximisation problem stated in (6) has a unique solution be-
cause the maximand is continuous and quasiconcave, h(I;uE) is strictly
decreasing and concave as stated in Lemma 1 and the set ￿ is non-
empty5. Figure 1 illustrates the generalised Nash bargaining solution.
uGN
￿=1=2 is the generalised Nash bargaining solution of the bargaining sit-
uation in which the set ￿ of possible utility pairs obtainable through





u, in the generalised Nash bargaining solution







Claim 1 provides a characterisation of the generalised Nash bargain-
ing solution of the bargaining situation described above (when function
h is di⁄erentiable):
Claim 1 For any ￿ 2 (0;1) and any bargaining problem (￿;du) 2 ￿
such that h(I;uE) is di⁄erentiable, the generalised Nash bargaining so-














and uP = h(I;uE):
4In this paper, we do not model the bargaining power of the two classes but we
instead capture it by the exogenous parameter ￿. We argue that ￿ can be linked
with the degree of impatience of the elites and the poor citizens. The class that is
more impatient tends to have a higher bargaining power. We assume that the elites
are less impatient than the poor citizens when ￿ is close to 1.









u, it may be characterised by ￿nding the value













































and uP = h(I;uE): (8)
Then, Claim 1 follows immediately from the ￿rst-order condition
given in expression (8).
Note that the above characterisation of the generalised Nash bar-
gaining solution is valid only for ￿ 2 (0;1). When ￿ = 0 or 1, we obtain
corner solutions for (uE;uP). When ￿ = 0, all the bargaining power is
in the hand of the poor citizens thus the poor citizens tend to choose ￿
G;xE￿
in such a way which ensures that the participation constraint of
the elites bind thus uE = dE
u. On the other hand, when ￿ = 1, the elites




which ensure that the poor citizens￿participation constraint
binds.
It is also useful to present some geometric characterisation of the
generalised Nash bargaining solution, which is valid when function h is
di⁄erentiable and follows Claim 1. For a given ￿ 2 [0;1], the generalised
Nash bargaining solution is the unique point uGN
￿ on the graph of h with
the property that the gradient of the line connecting the points uGN
￿ and
du is equal to the absolute value of the gradient of the unique tangent
to the graph of h at uGN
￿ . This is shown in Figure 1.
In this static model, we study two scenarios, namely (i) when there






(ii) when all the bargaining power is in the hands of the elites (￿ = 1).
We do not consider here another polar case when all the power is in the
hands of the poor citizens (￿ = 0). Starting with the case when there is






generalised Nash bargaining solution is point uGN
￿=1=2. In this case, our




u thus, in the society where
the distribution of power between the two classes is balanced, both the
elites and the poor citizens receive su¢ cient provision of public goods
and private goods so their participation constraints do not bind in the
equilibrium. Next, let us consider any point u on the graph of h to the
10right of uGN
￿=1=2 (when ￿ increases). The gradient of the line joining points
du and u has decreased relative to the gradient of the line joining points
du and uGN
￿=1=2, while the absolute value of the gradient of the tangent to
the graph of h at u has increased relative to the absolute value of the
slope of the tangent at uGN
￿=1=2. Therefore, the gradient of duu is strictly
lower than the absolute value of the gradient of the tangent at u. When
￿ = 1, the gradient of the line joining points du and uGN
￿=1 (denoted by
duuGN
￿=1) is equal to zero while the absolute value of the gradient of the
tangent to the graph of h at point uGN





u. It follows that, when the elites
have all the bargaining power, the elites determine the policy choices on ￿
G;xE;xP￿
subject to a binding participation constraint for the poor
citizens.
Therefore, when we ￿ increases from 1
2 to 1, we observe in Figure
1 that the generalised Nash bargaining solution, uGN
￿ , moves clockwise
along the utility possibility frontier from point uGN
￿=1=2 towards point uGN
￿=1.
What are the main implications? It is clear that the utility obtained by
the elites at the equilibrium, uGN
E , is increasing in ￿ while the utility
obtained by the poor citizens at the equilibrium, uGN
P , is decreasing in
￿. In sum, when both uGN
E and uGN





































These results show that the relative bargaining power of the elites (cap-
tured by parameter ￿) has a crucial impact on the utility obtained by
the two classes at the equilibrium.
We have seen from the above discussion that, when all the bargaining
power is in the hands of the elites, the elites make the policy choices on ￿
G;xE;xP￿
in such a way that most of the national resource is being
directed to ￿nance their own private consumption, at the same time,
providing minimal amount of G and xP to ensure that the participation
constraint of the poor citizens is satis￿ed. This problem of inadequate
provision of public goods and private goods for the poor citizens typically
occurs in the society where most of the bargaining power is in the hands
of the elites and it is the key factor behind the existence of ￿domestic
distributive con￿ict￿between the two classes in the society.
Next, we study the situation where the external funding agency de-
cides to grant an unconditional debt write-down to the country. Our
11objective is to show that the impact of an unconditional debt write-
down varies between societies, depending on the distribution of power
between the two classes. We want to show that, in the society where the
elites have all the bargaining power and the problem of domestic distrib-
utive con￿ict exists, an unconditional debt write-down bene￿ts the elites
and it does not lead to a su¢ cient improvement in the well-being of the
poor citizens. On the other hand, in the society with a balanced distribu-
tion of power between the two classes, an unconditional debt write-down
leads to a signi￿cant improvement in the well-being of the two classes.
We now turn to analyse each of these two scenarios in greater details.
Suppose the external funding agency grants an unconditional debt
write-down to a country by writing down an amount ’(1+r)D￿1 with no
condition attached, where 0 < ’ ￿ 1. The national resource following an
unconditional debt write-down is given by I0 = y+ ~ D￿(1￿’)(1+r)D￿1.
For 0 < ’ ￿ 1, it follows that I < I0. As stated in Lemma 1, an
increase in the national resource, I, results in an a¢ ne transformation
(an outward parallel shift) in the utility possibility frontier from the
curve labelled h(I;uE) to the one labelled h0 (I0;uE). This is illustrated
in Figure 1. Moreover, since di is assumed to be a fraction of I, an
increase in I also causes the disagreement utility of both elites and poor





We now discuss the impact of an unconditional debt write-down un-
der two scenarios: when ￿ = 1
2 and when ￿ = 1. When ￿ = 1
2, the










u. After an uncondi-
tional debt write-down has been granted, the elites￿and poor citizens￿
utilities are given by uGN0
E and uGN0
P , respectively. It is clear from Fig-




P thus the well-being of both
classes improves after an unconditional debt write-down. Therefore, in
the society where the distribution of power between the two classes is
balanced (when ￿ = 1
2 or close to 1
2), the unconditional debt write-down
is su¢ cient to ensure that the well-being of both classes improve.
When ￿ = 1, the generalised Nash bargaining solution is shown in










thus the participation constraint of the poor citizens binds. After an
unconditional debt write-down has been granted, the new generalised






the utility obtained by the poor citizens is higher than before as dP
u < dP0
u ,
the unconditional debt write-down is still not su¢ cient to ensure that the
well-being of the poor citizens improves since the policy choices of the




are still low, implying that their participation constraint
still binds in the equilibrium. Therefore, in the society where the elites
have all the bargaining power and the problem of domestic distributive
con￿ict exists (when ￿ = 1 or close to 1), it is crucial to make sure that
the appropriately designed conditionality requirements be attached to
the debt write-downs. Details of how such conditionality requirements
should be designed are discussed in the next section.
We summarise the above discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The relative utility gains of the two classes from the
debt write-down depends crucially on the distribution of power between
the elites and the poor citizens. With a balanced distribution of power,
an unconditional debt write-down is su¢ cient to ensure that the well-
being of both classes improve. When the problem of domestic distrib-
utive con￿ict between the two classes is prevalent, it is crucial that the
appropriately designed conditionality requirements be attached to the debt
write-down.
3 Conditionality requirements under the static model
In the previous section, we ￿nd that when elites have all the bargaining
power and the problem of domestic distributive con￿ict is prevalent, an
unconditional debt write-down is ine⁄ective as the provision of public
goods and private consumption level of the poor citizens are still consid-
ered inadequate. Moreover, the poor citizens￿participation constraint
always binds. In this section, we focus on the scenario where all the bar-
gaining power is in the hands of the elites (￿ = 1). We then study the
design of conditionality requirements attached to the debt write-down
under this scenario. Our objective is to ensure that the poor citizens￿
well-being improves after the debt write-down has been granted.


















is strictly increasing in both G and xE, the budget
constraint binds, that is, xE + xP + cG = I. The elites￿private con-
sumption, xE, can be rewritten as xE = I ￿cG￿xP; the non-negativity
constraint on the elites￿private consumption, xE ￿ 0, can be rewritten
as
￿
I ￿ cG ￿ xP￿
￿ 0; and the elites￿utility function, UE ￿
G;xE￿
, can
13be rewritten as UE ￿
G;I ￿ cG ￿ xP￿



































I ￿ cG ￿ x
P￿
;
where ￿1 and ￿2 are the Lagrange multipliers.









































u = 0; (11)
￿2 ￿ 0,
￿
I ￿ cG ￿ x
P￿
￿ 0 and ￿2
￿
I ￿ cG ￿ x
P￿
= 0: (12)
It is important to note that our objective is not to ￿nd the exact ana-
lytical solutions for the above maximisation problem. We, however, ￿nd
it instructive and useful to note the following graphic characterisation of
the solutions to the above maximisation problem. The graphic charac-
terisations for the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (11) and (12) are discussed
below and are given in Figure 2.
We begin with the Kuhn-Tucker condition (11). Since xP > 0, it fol-
lows that the participation constraint of the poor citizens always binds,
that is UP ￿
G;xP￿
= dP
u. This binding participation constraint for the
poor citizens is shown in Figure 2 as a standard indi⁄erence curve, which
is strictly convex and has a diminishing marginal rate of substitution.
Next, we consider the Kuhn-Tucker condition (12). The non-negativity
constraint on xE is subject to a complementary slackness in relation to





I ￿ cG ￿ xP￿
=
0. It follows that (i) when I ￿ cG ￿ xP > 0, @L
@(I￿cG￿xP) = 0, while (ii)









































Figure 2: The feasible set
when I ￿ cG ￿ xP = 0, @L
@(I￿cG￿xP) < 0. When the non-negativity con-
straint on xE does not bind (i.e. I ￿ cG ￿ xP > 0) this constraint can
be represented by the area below the line labelled G = I￿xP
c in Figure 2.
However, when the non-negativity constraint binds (i.e. I￿cG￿xP = 0),
it can be represented by the line, G = I￿xP
c , itself. Combining the non-
negativity constraint on the elites￿private consumption with the poor
citizens￿participation constraint yields the ￿feasible set￿ as shown in
Figure 2.
The analytical solutions for
￿
G;xE;xP￿
must satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker




pend crucially on where the elites￿indi⁄erence curve intersects the fea-
sible set and the shape of the elites￿indi⁄erence curve plays a key role.
Unfortunately, since the utility function of the elites takes the form of
UE ￿
G;I ￿ cG ￿ xP￿
, there is no unique shape for the elites￿indi⁄erence
curve. Therefore, no elites￿indi⁄erence curve is included in Figure 3 and
in other ￿gures throughout this section.
The corner solution exists when the elites￿indi⁄erence curve inter-
sects the feasible set at either end of the feasible set, i.e. NG1 or NG2,
in Figure 3. The corner solutions ￿both NG1 and NG2 ￿are known
as the ￿non-generic￿cases. On the contrary, the interior solution exists
when the elites￿indi⁄erence curve intersects the feasible set on the inte-
rior part of the feasible set. The interior solutions ￿such as GE ￿are
known as the ￿generic￿cases8. We begin our discussion with the two
non-generic cases, namely NG1 and NG2, followed by the generic case,
GE.
When the ￿rst non-generic case, NG1, exists, the policy choices for
8In fact, there are a continuum of
￿
G;xE;xP￿
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determined by the elites are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 as
~ GNG1 and ~ xP
NG1, respectively. What is the impact of an unconditional
debt write-down when NG1 exists? First, an unconditional debt write-
down causes the national resource to increase from I to I0, which in turn
leads to an expansion in elites￿non-negativity constraint set as the line
labelled G = I￿xP
c shifts to the dashed line labelled G = I0￿xP
c in Figure
4. Moreover, since the disagreement income of the poor citizens, dP,
is proportional to I, an unconditional debt write-down also causes the
poor citizens￿disagreement income and disagreement utility to increase
to dP0 and dP0
u , respectively. This leads to a rightward shift in the poor




the one labelled UP ￿
G;xP￿
= dP0
u in Figure 4.
In Figure 4, it is obvious that, under NG1, the elites use the money
freed up by the debt write-down to increase the provision of public goods
16from ~ GNG1 to ~ GNG0
1, and raise the private consumption level of the poor
citizens from ~ xP
NG1 to ~ xP
NG0
1. Even though both public good provision
and private consumption level of poor citizens increase after the exter-




made by the elites still subject the poor cit-
izens to a binding participation constraint. In other words, the poor
citizens￿utility is still being reduced to the disagreement utility shown
in Figure 4 as dP0
u . It is important to note that dP0
u is still considered to
be low relative target utility (which allows the MDGs to be achieved)
and inadequate level of poor citizens￿private consumption is perhaps
the key explanation. This suggests that, under the ￿rst non-generic
case NG1, the conditionality requirement that needs to be attached to
the debt write-down should target the private consumption level of the
poor citizens.
To ensure that the well-being of the poor citizens improves after the
granting of debt write-down, it is crucial that we determine the target
level of poor citizens￿utility, which is consistent with the MDGs9. Sup-
pose that the target level of poor citizens￿utility is denoted by ^ dP
u. Fixing
the level of public goods at ~ GNG0
1, if xP








NG1 will be the level of private consumption
for the poor citizens which allows the target level of poor citizens￿util-
ity, ^ dP
u, to be achieved. The conditionality requirement attached to the
debt write-down under the ￿rst non-generic case, therefore, should take
the form of xP ￿ xP
NG1. We assume that the target level of poor citi-
zens￿utility, ^ dP
u, is directly indexed to the conditionality xP ￿ xP
NG1 and
~ GNG0
1. When G increases from ~ GNG1 to ~ GNG0
1 and if the conditionality,
xP ￿ xP
NG1, is satis￿ed, ^ dP
u will be attained. When this is the case,
the external funding agency is assured that granting debt write-down to
the country will result in an improvement in the well-being of the poor
citizens in such country.
Next, we study the design of conditionality requirement under the
second non-generic case, which is characterised by point NG2 in Figure
4. The policy choices for
￿
G;xP￿
determined by the elites are shown in
Figure 4 as ~ GNG2 and ~ xP
NG2, respectively. Similar to the ￿rst non-generic
case, an unconditional debt write-down causes an expansion in the non-
negativity constraint set for the elites￿private consumption, resulting
in an outward parallel shift in the line G = I￿xP
c to G = I0￿xP
c , and a
9The idea we try to put forward here is similar to the operation of the MDGs.
We begin by setting goals, which aim at eradicating poverty and improving the well-
being of the poor, and follow through with measures that can be expected to achieve
those goals (including actions by both developing and industrialised countries)











determined by the elites following an uncondi-
tional debt write-down are given by ~ GNG0
2 and ~ xP
NG0
2, respectively. The
elites still make choices on ~ GNG0
2 and ~ xP
NG0
2 in such a way which ensures
that the poor citizens￿participation constraint binds. Considering these
new policy choices for
￿
G;xP￿
, it is clear that there is a large increase in
xP but a very small increase in G. Although compared to the situation
without an unconditional debt write-down, the poor citizens￿utility is
now higher than before, the poor citizens￿utility is still being reduced to
the disagreement level, dP0
u , which might be resulted from an insu¢ cient
provision of public goods.
It follows that, under the second non-generic case NG2, the debt
write-down granted to such country should target the provision of public
goods. Along the same lines as the ￿rst non-generic case, the external
funding agency needs to set the target level of poor citizens￿utility, which
is linked to the MDGs. Given the target level of poor citizens￿utility
^ dP
u and their private consumption ~ xP
NG0








u thus GNG2 is the level of public goods
which will ensure that ^ dP
u being achieved. Under NG2, the conditionality
requirement attached to the debt write-down should take the form of
G ￿ GNG2. We assume here that the the target level of the poor citizens￿
utility, ^ dP
u, is directly linked to G ￿ GNG2 and ~ xP
NG0
2 thus when xP
increases to ~ xP
NG0
2 and when the conditionality, G ￿ GNG2, is satis￿ed,
^ dP
u will be achieved. As a result, there will be an improvement in the
well-being of the poor citizens.
In what follows, we discuss the generic case, which is shown in Figure
3 as point GE. Even though in fact there exist a continuum of pairs ￿
G;xP￿
such that the point of intersection between the elites￿indi⁄erence
curve and the feasible set lies within the interior part of the feasible set,





~ GGE; ~ xP
GE
￿
. Corresponding to the policy choices
￿




the poor citizens￿participation constraint binds as the utility obtained
by the poor is at the disagreement utility, dP
u.
Next, we analyse the impact of an unconditional debt write-down
on the well-being of the poor citizens. An unconditional debt write-
down results in an increase in the national resource from I to I0. This






when the national resource increases from I to I0, dP
u also increases.
18causes the non-negativity constraint on the elites￿private consumption
to expand, leading to an outward parallel shift in the line G = I￿xP
c
to G = I0￿xP
c . Moreover, it also causes a rightward shift in the poor




Even though the poor citizens receive a higher utility than before as
dP0
u > dP
u, such new level of poor citizens￿utility, dP0
u , is still considered to
be low relative to one which is compatible with the MDGs. This supports
our result from the previous section that, when ￿ = 1 and under the
generic cases, the domestic distributive con￿ict exists as the elites always
have incentive to provide minimal amount of public goods and private
consumption to the poor citizens ￿the levels which are just su¢ cient
to ensure that poor citizens￿participation constraint binds. Therefore,
for the society where the problem of domestic distributive con￿ict is
prevalent, under the generic case, the unconditional debt write-down is
ine⁄ective.
When improvement in the well-being of the poor citizens is the main
objective of the external funding agency for granting debt write-down
to the low-income country and since the external funding agency cannot
make a direct transfer of utility to the poor citizens, the type of con-
ditional debt write-down and the details of conditionality requirements
attached to it matter. We now discuss di⁄erent types of conditional debt
write-down under the generic case.
We begin with the ￿rst type of conditional debt write-down, where
the conditionality requirement targets the provision of public goods.
First, the external funding agency determines the target level of poor
citizens￿utility, ^ dP
u. Given ^ dP
u and ￿xing the level of xP at ~ xP
GE, let G be





u. If ^ dP
u is directly indexed
by G ￿ G and ~ xP
GE, when the conditionality G ￿ G is satis￿ed and when
xP remains at ~ xP
GE, the target level of poor citizens￿utility, ^ dP
u, will be
achieved. However, this is not consistent with the elites￿incentive. Con-
sider the point GE0. Without imposing any condition on xP, the elites
have a strategic incentive to reduce expenditure on poor citizens￿private
consumption from ~ xP
GE to ~ xP
GE0. The elites then use the additional na-
tional resource freed up from a reduction in xP to support the additional
provision of public goods (equals to ￿G = G ￿ ~ GGE) to the condition
imposed by the external funding agency. The elites then divert all the
national resources freed up by debt write-down to increase in their pri-
vate consumption, xE. When this is the case, the target level of poor
citizens￿utility, ^ dP
u, cannot be achieved. As a result, this ￿rst type of
conditional debt write-down is ine⁄ective in improving the well-being of
the poor citizens. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: The ￿rst type of conditional debt write-down
where the conditionality requirement attached to debt write-down tar-
gets the private consumption level of the poor citizens. Given the target
level of poor citizens￿utility, ^ dP
u and assuming that G is constant at







u is directly indexed by the conditionality xP ￿ xP and ~ GGE;
when the conditionality is satis￿ed; and if G remains at ~ GGE, the tar-
get level of poor citizens￿utility, ^ dP
u, will be achieved. However, this is
not likely to be the case as the elites do not have an incentive to make
policy choices consistent with what we predict. Without imposing any
condition on the provision of public goods, the elites have a strategic
incentive to reduce G. By doing so, the elites can then use the national
resource freed up by a reduction in G (equal to ￿G = ~ GGE ￿ ~ GGE0) to
￿nance the additional private consumption of the poor citizens required
by the external funding agency, given by ￿xP = xP ￿ ~ xP
GE, and divert
all the additional national resources freed up by the debt write-down,
￿I = I0 ￿I, to support their private consumption. Consequently, there
is only a slight increase in the poor citizens￿utility from dP
u to dP0
u thus
the target level of poor￿utility, ^ dP
u, cannot be achieved. Hence, this sec-
ond type of conditional debt write-down is also ine⁄ective in improving
the well-being of the poor citizens. This is shown in Figure 6.
Finally, we consider the third type of conditional debt write-down,
where the conditionality requirements target both provision of public
goods and private consumption level of the poor citizens. First, the tar-
get level of poor citizens￿utility is set by the external funding agency
to be at ^ dP
u. Given ^ dP
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Figure 6: The second type of conditional debt write-down
above equation. When ^ dP
u is directly indexed by G ￿ G and xP ￿ xP
and when both conditionality requirements are satis￿ed, it is clear that
^ dP
u will be achieved. This is illustrated in Figure 7. From the ￿gure, the








there is an improvement in the well-being of the poor citizens to the tar-
get level) as there is an increase in both G and xP to the levels required
by the external funding agency. Thus, for the society where the elites
have all the bargaining power and the problem of domestic distributive
con￿ict between the elites and the poor citizens is prevalent, it is crucial
that the conditionality requirements attached to the debt write-down
under the generic case target both provision of public goods and private
consumption level of the poor citizens11.
Before proceeding to the next section, we want to clarify the following
points. It is important to note that the elites actually have two options
opened to them. The ￿rst option is not to accept the debt write-down
contract o⁄ered by the external funding agencies. If the elites choose this
option, they can ensure that the poor citizens￿participation constraint
binds as before and, at the same time, ensure that their own private
consumption is high. Let UE ￿
G;I ￿ cG￿ ￿ xP￿￿
denote the elites￿in-
direct utility if they decide not to accept the debt write-down, where
11In this model, the relative bargaining power of the two classes, captured by the
parameter ￿, has been taken as given; therefore, to ensure that the utility of the
poor citizens increases to the target level, it is crucial that the bargaining power
is tilted towards the poor citizens. This is achieved by making the conditionality
requirements attached to debt write-down target both provision of public goods and
private consumption level of the poor. It is interesting to note that the conditionality
requirement, which can lead to a decrease in ￿, can also lead us to the same end.
An example of such conditionality requirement includes the policy which supports
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Figure 7: The third type of conditional debt write-down
G￿;xE￿ and xP￿ denote the solutions to the maximisation problem pre-
sented at the beginning of this section and they satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (9) to (12). The second option that is opened to the elites
is to accept the debt write-down contract and the two conditionality
requirements attached to it, that is G ￿ G and xP ￿ xP. By ac-
cepting the debt write-down contract, on one hands, the elites become
better o⁄ as the national resource (I) becomes larger. On the other
hand, if the external funding agency sets G and xP to be too high,
the private consumption of the elites might turn out to be lower than
the amount they would otherwise receive if they choose not to accept
the debt write-down contract, i.e. xE￿. Therefore, in order to ensure
the elites have an incentive to accept such debt write-down contract, it
is very crucial that the following incentive compatibility constraint for
the elites be satis￿ed: UE ￿
G;I ￿ cG ￿ xP￿
￿ UE ￿
G;I ￿ cG￿ ￿ xP￿￿
,
where UE ￿
G;I ￿ cG ￿ xP￿
denotes the utility the elites obtain if they
accept the debt write-down contract. To ensure that this constraint is
satis￿ed, the external funding agency should make sure that the mini-
mum requirements on the public good provision and private consumption
level of the poor citizens should not be too high; otherwise, the elites
will choose not to participate in the debt write-down after all.
There are other three important issues that must be explicitly ad-
dressed: ￿enforceability￿ , ￿veri￿ability￿and ￿monitoring￿ . The idea of
linking debt write-down to public good provision and private consump-
tion level of the poor citizens is attractive; however, such conditional
debt write-down contract will not be implementable if the conditions
on provision of public goods and private consumption level of the poor
citizens cannot be enforced and the implementation of such conditions
by recipient government is di¢ cult to be veri￿ed by the external funding
agency. The question that usually arises is what are the public goods
22and private goods of the poor citizens meant by the external funding
agency in the debt write-down contract? Moreover, once the elites ac-
cepted the debt write-down contract and the conditionality requirements
attached to it, how can the external funding agency monitor and verify
that the elites actually comply with those conditionality requirements?
These issues of veri￿ability, enforceability and monitoring remain to be
investigated further in the future research.
We summarise the above discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For the society where the elites have all the bargaining
power and the problem of domestic distributive con￿ict is prevalent, it
is crucial that the conditionality requirements attached to the debt write-
down target both provision of public goods and private consumption level
of the poor citizens.
4 The dynamic model
In this section, we extend the model to a dynamic framework, which al-
lows us to capture another important aspect of poor governance, namely
the problem of ￿intertemporal con￿ict￿ . With this framework, we show
that the elites have a dynamic incentive to issue excessive public debts to
get around the conditionality requirements recommended by the static
model, which consist of G ￿ G and xP ￿ xP (hereafter, known as the
￿static- or short-run conditionality requirements￿ ).
We use a two-period repeated game framework where, in each pe-
riod, the elites and the poor citizens bargain over the partition of the
national resource. In any period t, if the elites and the poor citizens
fail to reach agreement, class i obtains a disagreement income di
t = ~ diIt,
where ~ di 2 (0;1) and t = 1;2. We still assume that the fractions, ~ dE and
~ dP, are exogenously determined and ~ dE > ~ dP. When no agreement can
be reached, the level of public good provision is zero and class i spends
all the disagreement income on his private consumption. It follows that













we assume that ~ dE
t > ~ dP
t , it follows that dE
u;t > dP
u;t thus the elites￿dis-
agreement utility is higher than the poor citizens￿ . We focus on the
scenario where the elites have all the bargaining power (￿ = 1); there-
fore, they are entitled to make decisions on the level of public goods
provision, private consumption for the poor citizens , their own private
consumption level, and the amount of public debts to be issued in each






















, is known as the ￿disagreement point￿ .
Let D0 > 0 denote the exogenously given stock of public debt at the
beginning of t = 1. The debt obligation falling due at in the ￿rst period
is given by (1 + r)D0. Without allowing the elites to issue new public
debts at t = 1, the national resource is given by ~ I1 = y1 ￿ (1 + r)D0.
After allowing the elites to issue public debts with an amount D1, the
￿rst-period national resource is given by I1 = ~ I1 + D1. Note that the
external funding agency does not place any restriction on the amount of
new public debts the elites are allowed to issue in the ￿rst period (that
is, there is no limit on D1).
Because of the uncertainty of their tenure and their myopic behav-
iour, we aim to show that the elites have a strong incentive to issue an
excessive amount of public debts in the ￿rst period. It is very important
to note that the resources generated from the issue of new public debts
by the elites are not very likely being directed by the elites to support
provision of public goods nor the poor citizens￿private consumption but
instead being used by them to ￿nance their own private consumption.
The policy choice on public debt made by the elites is very crucial as it
determines the probability of default: the policy which leads to an ex-
cessive issue of public debts in the ￿rst period increases the probability
of default. When default occurs, while the elites are insured against the
adverse impact of default, the poor citizens bear a disproportionately
high share of default costs as the country is permanently denied access
to the international capital market from that point onwards and there is
a permanent contraction in the national output. Such strategic incentive
of the elites to issue excessive amount of public debts is the key expla-
nation for the existence of intertemporal con￿ict between the elites and
the poor citizens. We show in this section that, when the intertemporal
con￿ict exists, it is necessary that the external funding agency puts an
explicit limit on the amount of public debts the elites are allowed to issue
in the ￿rst period together the imposition of the short-run conditionality
requirements in both periods.
The national income at t = 2 is y2. The national resource in the
second period, I2, is stochastic, depending on whether or not the elites
choose to default in the second period. We assume that, if default occurs,
there will be a permanent contraction in the national output by a fraction
(1 ￿ ￿), where ￿ 2 (0;1), and the country will be permanently excluded
from the international capital market from that period onwards.
For a given r, the probability of default is denoted by p(D1;r).12 If
12It is important to note that the rate of interest, r, also has a big impact on
the probability of default. Speci￿cally, a higher interest rate makes it more di¢ cult
24the elites chooses to default at t = 2, an event which occurs with prob-
ability p(D1;r), the national resource in the second period is ID
2 = ￿y2.
On the contrary, if the elites choose to repay the debts, an event which
occurs with probability 1￿p(D1;r), the second-period national resource
is IND
2 = y2￿(1+r)D1+ ￿ D2, where ￿ D2 is the limit the external funding
agency placed on the amount of public debts the elites are allowed to
issue in the second period. This limit on the second-period public debts
helps prevent the elites from issuing an excessive amount of public debts
in the second period and leaving the poor citizens saddled with a large
amount of debts to be serviced.
Consider an arbitrary uP
t . The possible values of uP
t should lie in
following closed interval13 ￿
U
P
t ; ￿ UP
t
￿
, which is derived as follows. The
lower bound, U
P
t , is a solution to problem:
U
P














1 represents the admissible set, which contains the following
constraints: xE
t + xP
t + cGt ￿ ~ It, Gt ￿ 0, xE
t ￿ 0 and xP
t ￿ 0, and the
upper bound, ￿ UP
t , is a solution to the problem:
￿ U
P

















t ; ￿ UP
t
￿
, the elites￿indirect utility is a solu-
tion to the following maximisation problem of the elites in period t:
u
E


























































Consider the following generalised Nash bargaining problem. For
each ￿ 2 [0;1], the generalised Nash bargaining solution is a unique pair



























for the elites to repay the public debts in the second period thus raising the default
probability, p(D1;r).













2 ￿0 : uP
t ￿ uP
￿








￿ denotes the exogenously given bargaining power of the poor citizens.







t and concave. An increase in I results in an a¢ ne transfor-






For a given ￿, since the maximand of this generalised Nash bargain-






strictly decreasing in uP
t and concave and the set ￿0 is nonempty, the
above generalised Nash bargaining problem has a unique solution14 and
should satisfy the ￿rst-order condition (similar to that stated in Claim





is di⁄erentiable, the interior generalised Nash bargaining solution is a




































However, for the corner solutions ￿when ￿ = f0;1g ￿the above ￿rst-
order condition does not apply. When ￿ = 0, uP
t = uP
￿








~ dP ~ It
￿￿
, while, when ￿ = 1, uP
t = ￿ UP
t and uE
t = ~ h
￿




In this section, since we focus on the society where the elites have all
the bargaining power, we study the above generalised Nash bargaining
under the assumption that ￿ = 0. Figure 8 provides a graphic char-
acterisation of the generalised Nash bargaining problem under the case
where ￿ = 0. The generalised Nash bargaining solution is illustrated in
￿gure as point GN.





, shown in Figure 8 has the
properties which are consistent with those presented in Lemma 1: for a





is strictly decreasing and concave. Moreover, since an






, it follows that an increase in national resource by allowing the
elites to issue public debts of an amount Dt leads to an outward parallel





to the one labelled ~ h
￿
~ It + Dt;uP
t
￿
. Since the disagreement income of







, which satisfy uP
t > uP
￿
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Figure 8: Utility possibility frontier in the dynamic model
both classes are proportional to the national resource, it follows that
the disagreement utility of both classes increases after an amount Dt of
public debts has been issued. Speci￿cally, the disagreement utilities of


















~ It + Dt
￿￿
, respectively. The new
generalised Nash bargaining solution is shown in Figure 8 as GN0.
A transition from point GN to GN0 as new public debts have been
issued by the elites ensures that the utility obtained by both classes
in the equilibrium increases. Although the poor citizens￿participation
constraint still binds even after Dt has been issued, as uP
￿







~ It + Dt
￿￿
, it follows that the poor citizens are better o⁄ with
Dt than without it. Therefore, issue new public debts of an amount
Dt is bene￿cial for both elites and poor citizens. It is very crucial to
note that the conclusion drawn here is done basing on the assumption
that no short-run or static conditionality requirement is being imposed
by the external funding agency. In sum, when no short-run conditional-
ity requirements are imposed by the external funding agency, the poor
citizens always prefer that new public debts, Dt, being issued.
In what follows, to show that the intertemporal con￿ ict exists, we
solve this two-period repeated game by using the backward induction
27approach. We begin by solving the second-period generalised Nash bar-
gaining problem for the scenario where ￿ = 0 and derive the value func-
tion or the second-period indirect utility for the elites. Given the value
function, we then move backwards to the ￿rst period to solve the ￿rst-
period generalised Nash bargaining.
The second period generalised Nash bargaining. The national
resource in the second period, I2, is stochastic, depending on whether
or not the elites choose to default. If the elites choose to default at
t = 2, they obtain the utility V E
2 (￿y2), while if they choose to honour
the debts, their utility is V E
2
￿
y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿
. The elites￿strategy





y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿
.
Suppose the elites use the threshold strategy such that, for some
^ D1 and for a given r, (i) whenever D1 > ^ D1, the elites choose to de-
fault with probability 1 in the second period, (ii) whenever D1 < ^ D1,
the elites choose not to default with probability 1 in the second period
and (iii) whenever D1 = ^ D1, the elites are indi⁄erent between default-
ing and not defaulting. It follows the threshold strategy of the elites
that, for a given r, the probability of default is discontinuous in D1.
Given p(D1;r), the value function of the elites in the second period,
V E






y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿￿
, where, when-
ever D1 < ^ D1, V E
2 (D1) = V E
2
￿
y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿
, and whenever
D1 > ^ D1; V E
2 (D1) = V E
2 (￿y2).
Consider two levels of ￿rst-period public debts, D1;D0
1, where D1 <
D0
1. If the elites choose not to default in the second period, a higher
D1 lowers the elites￿ value function as V E
2
￿
y2 ￿ (1 + r)D0






y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿
. However, if the elites choose to default, they
receive the utility V E
2 (￿y2), which is independent of D1. Therefore,
from their perspective, the elites are realise that they are indeed e⁄ec-
tively insured against the cost of default since whenever default occurs,
they are always guaranteed a minimum utility of V E
2 (￿y2) thereafter.
However, this is not the case for the poor citizens15. The poor citi-
zens are forced to bear a disproportionate cost of default. When no de-
fault occurs, an increase in D1 leads to a reduction in the poor citizens￿
utility. Consider two level of ￿rst-period public debts, D1;D0
1, where
D1 < D0
1. Our results show that uP
￿
~ dP ￿
y2 ￿ (1 + r)D0
1 + ￿ D2
￿￿
<
15Without the static or short-run conditionality requirements being imposed by
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which ensure that the poor citizens￿participation










y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿￿
. Moreover, as higher D1 implies that
the probability of default is higher and default implies a permanent
contraction in the national output and a permanent exclusion from the
international capital market, it follows that the poor citizens are worse
o⁄ with more public debts being issued in the ￿rst period.
The ￿rst-period generalised Nash bargaining problem. Con-
sider the national resource ~ I1, which does not include the issue of public
debt in the ￿rst period by the elites. Suppose that the external fund-
ing agency imposes the short-run conditionality requirements in the ￿rst








termined by the external funding agency with the target level of poor
citizens￿utility, ^ dP
u;1 in mind. The poor citizens￿￿rst-period utility is









is independent of D1.






~ dP ~ I1
￿
.
To determine the optimal ￿rst-period public debts from the poor cit-
izens￿perspective, DP

















y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿￿o
;
where fP denotes the discounted utility for the poor citizens and ￿P 2
(0;1) is the discount factor for the poor citizens.





independent of D1 but their second-period utility, uP
￿
~ dP ￿
y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿￿
,
is decreasing in D1, the poor citizens prefer that DP
1;opt = 0.
When the short-run conditionality requirements are imposed in the
￿rst period and the elites are not allowed to issue new public debts,







Next, we discuss how the elites respond to the presence of these short-
run conditionality requirements. Our results show that the elites can
get around these conditions by issuing new public debts in the ￿rst pe-
riod. When the new public debts, D1, has been issued, the national
resource is now given by ~ I1 + D1 and the indirect utility of the elites is
given by ~ h
￿




. Since the elites utility is strictly
increasing in G1 and xE
1 , it follows that ~ h
￿











. Thus, the elites are better o⁄ with more D1 so
they always have an incentive to issue public debts thus the ￿rst-period
indirect utility of the elites is represented by ~ h
￿





as D1 > 0. This leads us to the ￿rst result of this dynamic model: the
29elites can always get around the short-run conditionality requirements
by issuing new public debts in the ￿rst period. Next, we show that
the intertemporal con￿ict exists. This requires us to derive the optimal
￿rst-period public debts from the elites￿perspective, DE
1;opt.
We derive DE
1;opt from the elites￿maximisation problem. The elites




E = ~ h
￿













where fE denotes the discounted utility for the elites, ￿E 2 (0;1) is the
discount factor for the elites and ￿E = ￿P.
For the elites, as being discussed earlier, they always prefer to issue
strictly positive public debts to get around the short-run conditionality
requirements and since their ￿rst-period indirect utility is increasing in
D1, it follows that DE
1;opt > 0. Next, to show that DE
1;opt is high, let
us consider two levels of ￿rst-period public debts, D1;D0
1, where D1 <
D0
1. Since ~ h
￿












more public debts in the ￿rst period raises the elites￿￿rst-period indirect
utility. In the second period, even though a higher D1 lowers their in-
direct utility as V E
2
￿
y2 ￿ (1 + r)D0





y2 ￿ (1 + r)D1 + ￿ D2
￿
when the elites choose not to default, the elites can still prefer that more
public debts being issued in the ￿rst period as they can always opt out
by choosing to default. Even though the poor citizens will be worse o⁄
when default occurs as they have to bear a high cost of default (in the
form of permanent contraction in national output and permanent exclu-
sion from borrowing in the international capital market), the elites are
e⁄ectively insured against this cost of default as they are always guar-
anteed a ￿ oor in the utility they obtain given by V E
2 (￿y2). It follows
that the elites always have an incentive to issue a large amount of D1 so
DE
1;opt tends to be excessively high.
Since it is always true that DE
1;opt > DP
1;opt, an intertemporal con￿ ict
always exists even though both classes have the same discount rates.
The fact that an intertemporal con￿ ict exists even though both classes
have the same discount rate distinguishes our result from the literature.
In Easterly (1999), the elites￿behaviour to run up excessive public debts
can also be captured in the model which assumes that the elites have
a very high discount rate. In such model, the elites have a lower dis-
count factor than the poor citizens so ￿E < ￿P. According to Easterly
(1999, p.7), ￿a country that has got an excessive external debt is the one
with a high discount rate against the future perhaps because of a prof-
ligate government and/or because of political stability of interest group
polarization￿ . This is the second main result of dynamic model.
30To summarise, in the society where the elites have all the bargaining
power, an intertemporal con￿ict exists and the short-run conditionality
requirements are insu¢ cient to ensure that the well-being of the poor
citizens improves after the debt write-down has been granted as the elites
can always get around such conditions by issuing more public debts in
the ￿rst period. With the presence of these problems, we propose that
the external funding agency attaches the ￿dynamic- or long-run condi-
tionality requirements￿to the debt write-down granted to the country in
the ￿rst period. Details of such conditionality requirements are discussed
below.
Suppose the external funding agency wants to grant a conditional
debt write-down to such economy in the ￿rst period. When designing
the conditionality requirements to be attached to the debt write-down,
the external funding agency needs to be fully aware of the situation
both at t = 1 and at t = 2. The set of conditionality requirements
for the ￿rst period should target the provision of public goods, G1, the
private consumption level of the poor citizens, xP
1 , and the amount of
public debts the elites allowed to issue in the ￿rst period, D1. Formally,
the ￿rst-period conditionality requirements should consist of G1 ￿ G1,
xP
1 ￿ xP
1 and D1 ￿ ￿ D1, where ￿ D1 denotes a limit on the amount of
public debt the elites are allowed to issue in the ￿rst period thus the last
condition, D1 ￿ ￿ D1, prevents the elites from issuing excessive amount
of public debts at t = 1. The ￿rst two requirements, G1 ￿ G1 and
xP
1 ￿ xP
1 , help ensure that the poor citizens receive su¢ cient public
goods and private consumption in the ￿rst period.
For the second period, since the debt limit on D2 is already present,
the conditionality requirements attached to the debt write-down should
include G2 ￿ G2 and xP
2 ￿ xP
2 . These two conditionality requirements
help ensure that the poor citizens are not much adversely a⁄ected if the
elites indeed choose to default in the second period. This recommen-
dation to attach the long-run conditionality requirements to the debt
write-down is the third result of this section.
Finally, similar to the static framework, even though it might be easy
for the external funding agency and the debtor￿ s government to write
a debt write-down contract which incorporate the long-run conditions,
the issues of veri￿ability, enforceability and monitoring still remain to
be investigated further.
We summarise the above discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In the society where the elites have all the bargaining
power, the short-run conditionality requirements are no longer su¢ cient
in the long-run as the elites can always get around these conditions by
issuing more public debts. Since an intertemporal con￿ict exists, the
31long-run conditionality requirements should instead be attached to the
debt write-down.
5 The current debt relief initiatives and policy rec-
ommendations
At present, the HIPC initiative of 1999 (also known as the enhanced
HIPC initiative) and the Gleneagles Proposal for debt write-down by the
G8 countries are the main mechanisms used to reduce the indebtedness
of the low-income countries. In this section, we aim to evaluate the
e¢ cacy of these two debt relief initiatives: discussing their additivity to
the current debt relief operation as well as addressing their key criticisms.
We begin with the enhanced HIPC initiative, followed by the Gleneagles
Proposal.
The enhanced HIPC initiative has been notable not only because
it emphasises debt stock reduction but also it keys the extent of debt
stock reduction to a sustainable level, it has been subject to several se-
rious criticisms. To name some, ￿rst, the foreign creditors have failed
to include serious analysis of country￿ s needs in their debt relief oper-
ation; instead, they use arbitrary formulas to judge the countries￿debt
sustainability16. Second, debt reduction under the HIPC initiative is
usually tied to inappropriate conditionality requirements, particularly
those related to the IMF programme.
The myriad of conditions set forth by the IMF, even though they are
well-intentioned, sometimes turn out to be counter productive. In par-
ticular, they may distract the government from addressing the pressing-
concern issues, especially the problems of poor governance and inade-
quate investment in education and health. They generally do not succeed
in engendering development. In the view of one of its critics, ￿the IMF
conditionality sometimes leaves the country just as impoverished but
with more debts and even richer ruling elite,￿(Stiglitz, 2003). The IMF
ignores the issue of governance and fails to take into account the impact
of distribution of power on the well-being of the poor citizens. Moreover,
the IMF typically prescribes the policy to maintain ￿scal surplus, which
makes it di¢ cult for such countries to focus on their priorities, including
enhancing governance and accountability on the part of government and
promoting social contract. With such conditionality requirements being
16Under the enhanced HIPC initiative, the benchmark for debt sustainability was
set at 150 percent debt-to-export ratio (on a net present value basis) or 250 percent
NPV of debt to tax revenue for countries with open economies (a minimum of 30
percent export-to-GNP ratio) and substantial tax revenue (a minimum of 15 percent
of GNP) (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002).
32imposed, the ruling elites can ensure that such conditionality require-
ments are satis￿ed even though no money freed up by debt write-down
is directed to investment in health and education, the factors which are
central to the progress of improving the well-being of the poor citizens
and achieving the MDGs17.
Since it is di¢ cult for the MDGs to be achieved and development to
be promoted if debt obligations are excessive, recently the Commission
for Africa called for a 100 percent debt write-down and a boost in aid
(Commission for Africa, 2005). Responding to the request made by
the Commission for Africa, the G8 nations reached a landslide debt
relief deal at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005,
agreeing to write down $40 billion debt owed by 18 countries, mainly in
Africa, which reached the completion point under the enhanced HIPC
initiative. Moreover, the G8 countries also reached an agreement to
boost foreign aid to such countries. This move provided relief for poor
indebted nations, freeing up much needed revenue.
It is crucial to note that, since the debt write-down granted by the G8
countries has not been tied to explicit set of conditionality requirements,
there is no guarantee that the government of such countries will use
money, which would otherwise go to service debt payment, to support
provision of necessary public goods and better the lives of its people.
It, therefore, becomes a challenge on the part of the government of such
countries how they will spend the money they have been paying on debts.
We argue that a decision to cancel debts of the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPCs) can free such countries from excessive debt burdens;
however, in overall, it cannot lead to improvement in the well-being of
the poor citizens and achievement of the MDGs without an improvement
in governance and if the governments of such countries do not adhere
to ￿scal discipline. The results from our formal analysis suggest that
the government of such countries should undertake the following set of
mutually reinforcing reforms.
First, the foreign creditors should support a greater transparency in
public ￿nancial management by focusing on enhancing transparency in
revenues, budgets and expenditure together with taking credible action
against corruption. A mechanism akin to the ￿Poverty Action Fund￿
used in Uganda could be a useful starting point. The money that would
have been spent on servicing debt can be directed to the Poverty Action
Fund and from there the money will be channelled into the country￿ s
health and education systems (BBC, 2005). This type of mechanism
17By no mean restricted to low-income countries, this model may be applied to
study similar problems in Latin America, where the elites divert public funds to safe
havens overseas.
33can help minimise the chance that government diverts the public funds
to support corruption and transfers them to safe havens overseas.
Once the country has shown a satisfactory improvement in gover-
nance, the next policy recommendation enters into consideration, in-
cluding some put forward by the G8 nations in the Gleneagles Sum-
mit in Scotland (the Gleneagles CommuniquØ, 2005). It is important
that the government supports strategies to improve provision of public
goods, especially health, education, food security and basic infrastruc-
ture. Whenever possible, these public goods should be provided free of
charge.
6 Conclusion
To address the two problems related to poor governance, namely domes-
tic distributive con￿ict and intertemporal con￿ict, we develop a model
of debt write-down, where the conditionality requirements attached to
debt write-down are designed so as to ensure that the well-being of the
poor citizens is improved. We consider two versions of the model, static
and dynamic. The results from our static model show that an uncondi-
tional debt write-down is only e⁄ective in the society with a balanced
distribution of power between the elites and the poor citizens as it leads
to an improvement in the well-being of both classes. However, for the
society where the elites have all the bargaining power and the problem of
domestic distributive con￿ict is prevalent, the external funding agency
should attach the appropriately designed conditionality requirements,
which target both provision of public goods and private consumption of
the poor citizens, to the debt write-down.
Our results in the dynamic framework show that, over time, the
elites can get around the static conditionality requirements by issuing
more new public debts. The problem of intertemporal con￿ict arises
because of the con￿ icting views of the poor citizens and the elites with
regards to the issue of new public debts in the ￿rst period. With the
presence of the static conditionality requirements, the poor citizens do
not bene￿t from the newly issued public debts in the ￿rst period as they
are guaranteed a target level of utility in any case; moreover, they are
forced to bear a disproportionately high share of default costs in the
second period. However, for the elites, issuing more public debts in the
￿rst period is bene￿cial for them as that increases their utility; at the
same time, they are e⁄ectively insured against the cost of default in the
second period. With the problem of intertemporal con￿ict in mind, we
propose that the long-run conditionality requirements should, instead,
be attached to the debt write-down.
Against such a benchmark, we then evaluate the e¢ cacy of the cur-
34rent proposals for debt write-down under both the HIPC and the G8
initiatives. The recent agreement reached by the G8 countries to grant
a complete debt write-down on poor countries￿debts and the promise to
boost aid are not adequate to get development in those countries back
on track if the money freed up by debt relief and aid is not used to better
the lives of the poor people. This can only be viewed as the ￿rst step in
the reinvention of development assistance process.
We argue that such initiatives to cancel debts of the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPCs) can free such countries from excessive
debt burdens; however, in overall, it cannot lead to improvement in the
well-being of the poor citizens and achievement of the MDGs without an
improvement in governance. The results from our formal analysis sug-
gest that the external funding agency supports a greater transparency in
public ￿nancial management by focusing on enhancing transparency in
revenues, budgets and expenditure together with taking credible action
against corruption. Provided that the country has shown a satisfac-
tory improvement in governance, then each government should support
strategies to improve provision of public goods, especially health, edu-
cation, food security and basic infrastructure.
In the future, we aim to extend the model to study the situation
where debt is issued for the consumption smoothing purpose. We aim
to investigate how the degree of risk aversion of the elites a⁄ect the
amount of self-enforcing debt which can be sustained in the equilibrium.
Another plausible extension is to study the situation where the ruling
elites have a hyperbolic preference. It would be interesting to show that
the elites may end up issuing an excessive amount of pubic debts due to
myopia.
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 proceeds in two steps. First, we begin by prov-
ing that, for a ￿xed I, the function h(I;uE) is strictly decreasing in uE.
The utility possibility frontier, h(I;uE), is derived by solving the max-





subject to ￿1 and ￿2. There is no interior solution for this problem as
the objective function, UP ￿
G;xP￿
, is strictly increasing in G and xP. It
follows that a corner solution,
￿
G;xP￿
= (1;1), exists . Moreover, the
four constraints in the admissible set, ￿1, are linear thus the admissible
set ￿1 is a convex set. Since UE ￿
G;xE￿




follows that UE ￿
G;xE￿
￿ uE is convex; therefore, ￿2 is also a convex
set. When both ￿1 and ￿2 are convex sets, it follows that ￿1 \ ￿2 is a
convex set; therefore, the constraint set is quasiconcave.
Next, in order to establish that the function h(I;uE) is strictly de-
35creasing in uE, we choose uE = U
E thus the set ￿2 does not have any
impact. Increasing uE causes the set ￿1 to shrink. With a smaller admis-
sible set, the indirect utility of the poor citizens, h(I;uE), declines. This























This proves that the utility possibility frontier, h(I;uE), is strictly de-
creasing in uE.
We then prove that, for a ￿xed I, the utility possibility frontier,
h(I;uE), is concave in uE. It follows from the Envelope Theorem that,
if the objective function is concave in both decision variables and the
constraint set is quasiconcave, the value function is concave. In this
context, the objective function, UP ￿
G;xP￿
, is concave in both G and
xP, the constraint set is quasiconcave, and the function h(I;uE) is the
value function. Applying the Envelope Theorem, we ￿nd that, for a




























Therefore, the utility possibility frontier, h(I;uE), is concave.
Next, we study the impact of an increase in I on the utility possibility
set and the graph of function h(I;uE). First, we establish that the
utility possibility set is increasing in I. For any two arbitrary national
resources, I;I0 > 0, where I0 > I, since anything that is feasible with I0
is not necessarily feasible with I, it follows that an increase in I leads
to an expansion in the utility possibility set. Second, we show that an
increase in I leads to an a¢ ne transformation in the utility possibility
frontier, h(I;uE). We multiply both I and uE, by any arbitrary scalar,
￿ > 0. Since h(￿I;￿uE) = ￿h(I;uE), increasing I leads to an a¢ ne
transformation in the utility possibility frontier. Hence, increasing the
national resource from I to I0 leads to an outward parallel shift in the
graph of function h(I;uE) to h0 (I0;uE) as shown in Figure 1.
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